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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report was requested by Representative Anne Gobi to discuss the benefits and risks 
associated with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and develop recommendations based on the data 
collected. Concern about the safety of the plant increased after the accident that happened at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March 11, 2011. Extensive research was done to 
formulate recommendations on the safety of the plant and its evacuation plans.  
Since there are a number of complexities surrounding the nuclear plant, the goal of this 
project was to discuss the benefits and risks associated with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and 
develop recommendations based on the data collected. To accomplish our goal, we established 
three primary objectives.  
1. Assess the risks for an accident that currently exist at Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station. 
2. Evaluate the current emergency response and evacuation plans at Pilgrim. 
3. Analyze the societal, environmental, and economic impacts the plant has under 
both normal operating conditions and in the event of a disaster. 
The data to accomplish these objectives was collected by means of archival research 
supplemented with key interviews. 
Applying the Fukushima Disaster to Pilgrim 
As a result of the insufficient flood protection and design, water from the tsunami 
disabled eleven of the twelve generators and the cooling water pumps at Fukushima (Mohrbach, 
2011). The loss of these generators caused an entire station blackout. The loss of offsite power 
combined with the loss of diesel power at a nuclear power plant increases the risk of malfunction 
by approximately seventy percent (USNRC, 2005). Pilgrim has two diesel generators for the one 
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active reactor on site, and they are both located in separate, elevated locations (Eldred, 2012). To 
further reduce the risk of a complete station blackout, Pilgrim has a third station blackout 
generator. This station blackout generator is also located in a watertight, elevated location. In the 
event that Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station lost power and both diesel generators were destroyed, 
the third station blackout generator would maintain safe function of the plant (T.Setzer, personal 
communication, October 3, 2012).  
As a direct result of the destruction of both the generators and the cooling water pumps, 
the supply of cooling water available to cool the core of Reactor One at Fukushima was 
drastically limited. The ultimate heat sink at Pilgrim is called salt service water [SSW] and has 
five vertical pumps that draw water from the Cape Cod Bay (USNRC, 2007). The SSW consists 
of two open loops, and each loop requires two pumps. In the event of a loss of coolant accident 
[LOCA], only one loop of SSW is required to properly cool the core of the reactor. Pilgrim has a 
backup cooling water loop and a common spare in the event of a core shutdown (USNRC, 2007). 
Based on the structural differences between the generators and the cooling pumps at Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the exact same cooling 
failure could not occur at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. 
After the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, the USNRC immediately performed inspections 
at all United States nuclear power plants (T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012). 
The inspection assessed Pilgrim’s ability to mitigate the consequences of large fires and 
explosions, station blackout conditions [SBO], internal and external flooding, and the 
thoroughness of the emergency response procedures (USNRC, 2011d).   
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Spent Fuel at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 
The spent fuel pool at Pilgrim has the capacity to hold 1000 fuel assemblies, and the 
reactor core at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station has roughly 580 fuel assemblies (T.Setzer, 
personal communication, October 3, 2012). Approximately every 18-24 months, roughly 194 
fuel assemblies in the reactor core at Pilgrim must be removed and placed in a spent fuel 
pool(T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012). This process is called a fuel outage 
(See Glossary). Fuel outages are completely necessary for the reactor to function properly, but 
this process fills the spent fuel pool in a matter of years. 
While spent fuel pools are only a temporary means of storage for the fuel assemblies, dry 
cask storage provides a more permanent solution. Pilgrim recently licensed the company Holtec 
to begin building dry cask storage structures (T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 
2012). In fact, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station must have the dry cask storage up and running 
within the next few years because they are running out of space in their spent fuel pool (T.Setzer, 
personal communication, October 3, 2012). While dry cask storage is a safer means of storage in 
terms of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s current spent fuel situation, it is not a feasible solution 
for all nuclear power plants. Under these circumstances, the nuclear power industry should shift 
their focus to developing a plan to remedy the dangerous spent fuel situation. 
Possible spread of radiation around Pilgrim 
Wind plays a crucial role in the spread of radiation.  After the disaster at Fukushima, 
wind carried dangerous levels of radiation nearly 30 miles inland, covering an area of more than 
700 square miles.  If a similar disaster were to occur at Pilgrim, the radiation could contaminate 
the entire county of Plymouth and portions of Barnstable County as well.  Wind patterns show 
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that the majority of Cape Cod is susceptible to receive significant levels of radiation in the event 
of a disaster. 
Evacuation response at Fukushima 
Reports show that the evacuation after the Fukushima was poorly executed due to major 
communication failures between TEPCO, the owner of Fukushima, and the Japanese 
government.  The evacuation radius was eventually expanded to twice the planned distance 
which caused a significant amount of confusion and chaos among Japanese residents.  The 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Committee (NAIIC) reports that 146,520 people 
were evacuated in total and many were relocated more than once due to the three evacuation 
zone expansion orders.  This shows that all parties involved with emergency preparedness at 
Fukushima was completely unprepared to handle a disaster of this magnitude. We can learn a 
significant amount from this that we can apply to emergency response procedures at nuclear 
power plants in the United States in order to make the evacuation plans more appropriate for a 
potential disaster. 
Emergency plan and Evacuation for Pilgrim 
The evacuation plan at Pilgrim is designed and executed by the Nuclear Preparedness 
Department (NPD) of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).  The 
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding Pilgrim includes the towns of Plymouth, 
Kingston, Duxbury, and portions of Carver and Marshfield (Entergy, 2011).  The plan covers 
reception centers, Radiological Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Stations 
(RWEMDS), and transportation for schools, licensed day care facilities, children's camps, 
nursing homes, hospitals, group homes, and correctional facilities.  The Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan also includes services such as environmental monitoring, public alerting, special 
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needs assistance, crisis counseling, meal accommodations for evacuees, business restoration 
assistance, and many others.  The training department offers training to the approximately 4700 
emergency responders for Pilgrim and conducts federally evaluated emergency exercises every 
two years (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2012).   
The current evacuation plan for Pilgrim involves a 10 mile radius as required by the 
NRC.  This zone is home to more than 75,000 people, as well as 21 public schools and one 
hospital.  In order to notify the public of a nuclear threat, Entergy owns and operates 112 
emergency sirens within the 10 mile radius of the plant.  These sirens will alert residents that 
there is a potential threat, and residents are instructed to tune to one of the Emergency Alert 
System (EAS) Radio Stations.  The evacuation plan is only effective in the 10 mile radius so it is 
susceptible to many of the same failures that were experienced at Fukushima. 
Cape Cod presents a unique scenario for disaster planning.  Large portions of Cape Cod 
are at high risk for dangerous levels of radiation if a disaster were to occur at Pilgrim.  Since the 
Cape does not fall within the 10 mile radius of the plant, there is no predetermined evacuation 
plan in place for a nuclear disaster.  There is an emergency plan designed in response to 
hurricanes or other severe weather, however this plan does not take into account the issues 
involved with a nuclear scenario and most likely will not be implemented in the event of a 
nuclear disaster.  If a disaster were to occur that would require the evacuation of portions or the 
entire cape, there are several issues that will need to be addressed.  One primary concern is that 
there are only two bridges (excluding the railroad bridge) that cross the Cape Cod Canal, both of 
which are within 20 miles of the plant.  Although this concern has been acknowledged by the 
NRC, an alternative plan has not been determined (Cassidy, 2012). 
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Environment after a Disaster 
 Chernobyl accident may have benefitted certain species of animals because of the 
creation of a mostly human-free exclusion zone. Species of eagles have been able to move into 
the zone to reproduce without any human disturbances, which has been beneficial for the eagles 
and other species. However, while there may have been some beneficial effect to the accident on 
the environment, the radiation did have a negative impact on the flora and fauna around 
Chernobyl. The worst effects on the environment occurred in a twenty mile radius around the 
plant. Radiation decreased the reproductive success of much of the flora and fauna, which 
decreased both the amount and variety of plants and animals in the areas around the plant 
(Geras'kin,S.A.; Fesenko,S.V.; Alexakhin,R.M., 2008). Even if not killed directly from the 
accident, if populations of fish are rendered sterile it could sharply decrease the population 
numbers for future generations. In a controlled study done on Tilapia it was found that at an 
exposure level of .0004 - .0005 grays of strontium-90 per day had a noticeable change on 
reproduction. These levels were maintained for 90 days providing a total dose of .036-.045 Gy, 
which is about four times above the normal background levels. The males had smaller gonads, 
reproduction started earlier, and there were 20 percent fewer normal offspring per female 
(Sazykina,T. G.; Kryshev,A. I.,2003). 
The impact of the intake of the cooling system on the environment is also a concern. 
Over a period of twenty-six years the Pilgrim power plant was responsible for the impingement 
of at least 562,025 fish and shellfish and the entrainment of 24,314,325,386,670 (24 trillion) fish 
and shellfish eggs and larvae (Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2002). It is difficult to 
determine the impact this has had on Cape Cod Bay without further research being performed. 
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Human Health 
 The effects of radioactive iodine on the thyroid are some of the most documented 
topics when it comes to how radiation affects the human body. Because thyroid cancer develops 
in children who have been exposed to radioactive isotopes of iodine it became a noticeable trend 
after the Chernobyl accident. There was an international average rate of thyroid cancer in 
children of 1 for every million child per year before the accident while after the accident one 
measurement showed 44 cases of thyroid cancer in children for every million children per year in 
Belarus. 
Recommendations 
After extensive research, we came to the following conclusions and recommendations:  
 Moving the spent fuel from the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to a permanent 
will need to be done in the future, and to do so, a permanent nuclear repository 
must be developed. 
 A secondary evacuation plan with a 20 mile radius should be developed so that it 
can be executed in the event that a disaster at Pilgrim exceeds the scope of a 10 
mile evacuation 
 A disaster plan should be developed for Cape Cod that provides the same services 
offered to those within the current 10 mile evacuation zone, as well as evacuation 
routes for those living on the Cape within 20 miles of the plant. 
 If an accident were to occur, the thyroid health of children should be the prime 
health concern. 
 More research must be done to determine the effect Pilgrim’s intake system has 
on Cape Cod Bay.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of its many benefits, the use of nuclear power has been debated since its 
establishment because of the associated risks. However, the complexities of nuclear power make 
it difficult to decisively evaluate the risks and benefits. For anyone living near Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station in Plymouth, MA, it is difficult to ignore the incidents that have happened at 
places like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima. It is possible that a disaster could 
occur at any nuclear facility. For this reason, the prevention of disasters through study of 
previous disasters is the best approach to prevent future incidents from occurring in plants that 
are currently operating.  
The goal of this project is to discuss the benefits and risks associated with Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station and develop recommendations based on the data collected. This goal was 
accomplished by analyzing the risks due to a catastrophic accident; analyzing the societal, 
environmental, and economic impacts associated with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station under 
normal and emergency operating procedures; and evaluating the current emergency response and 
evacuation plans.  
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, located in Plymouth, Massachusetts, is similar in design 
to the Fukushima Daiichi Plant. The similarities between these two nuclear power plants 
warranted a second look at the current condition of the plant, as well as an analysis of the plant’s 
safety protocols. Pilgrim’s operating license was renewed on June 8, 2012. The United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [USNRC] can grant license renewals for between twenty and 
forty years depending on the mechanical degradation of the power plant (USNRC, 2011b).  The 
renewal of Pilgrim’s license means the plant will be able to operate for another twenty years, so 
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there is concern that over the course of twenty years safety components could deteriorate causing 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to have an increased risk of a disaster.  
Our sponsor for this project is State Representative Anne Gobi, and she has requested a 
thorough evaluation of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Representative Gobi is the representative 
for Worcester’s fifth district which includes the towns of Barre, Brookfield, East Brookfield, 
Hardwick, Hubbardston, New Braintree, North Brookfield, Oakham, Spencer, Ware, and West 
Brookfield. As sponsor of this project and as a state representative, her job is to voice the 
concerns of the people she represents. Representative Gobi wants to ensure that the plant is not a 
potential threat to the citizens of Massachusetts. She is also the Chair of the Environment, 
Natural Resources, and Agricultural Joint Committee, which heightens her interest in the safety 
of the nuclear plant.  
Studies published by organizations such as The Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers [IEEE], United Nations Scientific Commission on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 
[UNSCEAR], USNRC, and the International Commission on Radiological Protection [ICRP] 
examine the effects of radiation on humans and the environment. Case studies from Chernobyl 
(1986) and Fukushima (2011) provide information on how emergency protocols and evacuation 
plans can succeed and fail. 
The outcome of the project has the potential to create further conversation within the state 
government and help Representative Gobi lead her committee to address the difficult questions 
that will be asked by her constituents and government officials. The recommendations are based 
on the team’s research and are not attributable to Representative Gobi.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this project was to discuss the benefits and risks associated with Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station and develop recommendations for our sponsor Representative Anne Gobi. 
To accomplish this goal, we established three primary objectives.  
1. Assess the risks for an accident that currently exist at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. 
2. Evaluate the current emergency response and evacuation plans at Pilgrim. 
3. Analyze the societal, environmental, and economic impacts the plant has under both 
normal operating conditions and in the event of a disaster. 
Upon completion of these three objectives, we made recommendations regarding how to 
reduce the risk of a disaster at Pilgrim and how to minimize the negative effects of a disaster if 
one were to occur.   
Objective 1: Assess the risks for an accident that exist at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station  
In order to determine whether Pilgrim is at risk for a nuclear disaster, it was important to 
understand what factors would contribute to the development of a disaster scenario. We 
examined technical documents to understand the extent of redundancy and backup devices 
involved in the engineering of this power plant.  We also accounted for the environment and 
weather conditions to determine whether or not these would have any effect on the operation of 
the plant. Researching the recent disaster at Fukushima played a critical role in this aspect of the 
project. Since the design of Pilgrim is similar to that of Fukushima, we can determine what 
design flaws contributed to the Fukushima disaster and determine whether they pose a threat to 
Pilgrim. In addition, we researched other unique conditions at Pilgrim that pose a potential threat 
to safe operation. 
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Objective 2: Evaluate the current emergency response and evacuation plans at Pilgrim 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing evacuation plans at Pilgrim, we have 
conducted archival research on the emergency response and evacuation plans at Pilgrim. We 
examined case studies regarding the successes and failures of emergency procedures that were 
executed in response to disasters such as Fukushima and Chernobyl. Using that data, we were 
able to determine whether any of the flaws experienced in those plans are present in Pilgrim’s 
emergency plan. Another valuable resource was reports from practice drills and exercises at 
Pilgrim. Those reports illuminated potential weak spots, allowing us to make recommendations 
to improve the safety and effectiveness of emergency and evacuation procedures. 
Objective 3: Analyze the societal, environmental, and economic impact the plant has under 
both normal operating conditions and in the event of a disaster 
It is unrealistic to deny that a disaster at any nuclear power plant is possible. However 
large or small the risk may be, there is always a possibility of a catastrophic failure at a nuclear 
power plant and it is important to understand the implications of this risk. Radiation is known to 
have detrimental effects on health and the environment so we researched how the fallout from a 
disaster at Pilgrim could potentially affect the surrounding communities and ecosystems. 
In order to understand societal effects of radiation, we compiled relevant information by 
performing archival research on this topic. Searching online databases for journal articles and 
published works was the best method to accomplish this. The information needed in order to 
assess the possible health effects on the population living near the power plant was mainly case 
studies of the impact that accidents such as Chernobyl had on the victims. Controlled testing of 
the effects of radiation on humans is unethical, and therefore there is no documentation of this; 
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however we found controlled studies on animals done by researchers as well as research done on 
humans exposed to radiation for the treatment of cancer. 
Radiation effects on plants and wildlife have been studied in relation to the environment 
surrounding Pilgrim. Massachusetts’ environment and agriculture differs from that of 
Fukushima, so special considerations were taken. We have placed an emphasis on the potential 
impact an accident could have on the agricultural industry of Massachusetts.  Again, studies on 
Chernobyl have been reliable sources to review. Another important environment to examine is 
marine life and the fishing industry due to Pilgrim’s close proximity to the Cape Cod Bay. 
Reports on controlled radiation studies performed on plant life were used from different 
databases. 
A disaster of any magnitude will evidently have dramatic economic costs; however this 
cost is determined by many factors such as the severity of the disaster and the location of the 
plant in regards to population density and infrastructure. In order to make an assessment, we 
researched how all of these factors contribute to the cost of a disaster, as well as researched what 
other factors may have an effect. This was done by collecting documents that detailed the 
evacuation, reparation, and cleanup costs of previous disasters and applying this data to 
Plymouth and the Eastern and Central Massachusetts areas. 
 
  
17 
 
 
DATA AND DISCUSSION 
 Understanding the history of both the Plymouth and Fukushima power plants is vital in 
being able to analyze and understand the risks that Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station may face in 
case of a catastrophic failure. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is owned and operated by Entergy 
Energy Corporation. Entergy is primarily involved with power distribution and currently owns 
and operates twelve reactors in the United States (Entergy, 2012).  
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is located in Plymouth, Massachusetts and has been 
operating since 1972. Entergy acquired the plant in July of 1999. The previous owner was the 
Boston Edison Company. The single GE Mark I-BWR type three reactor at Pilgrim has a 685-
megawatt (MW) output (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2011). Nuclear power 
plants are examined after forty years of operation to ensure the integrity of the nuclear plant has 
not become weakened by age. Since the plant has been operating for forty years, its license was 
up for renewal in June of 2012. The license renewal was granted, and Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station was permitted to operate for another twenty years (USNRC, 2011b). Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station’s power output is enough to power 550,000 homes in Massachusetts; there are 
currently approximately 2.8 million homes in Massachusetts (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). 
Information about Pilgrim can be publicly accessed through the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission [USNRC]. The USNRC is responsible for rectifying the mechanical 
degradation of safety related components and relicensing all power plants in the United States.  
Our sponsor, State Representative Anne Gobi, asked our team to determine whether 
Pilgrim would exhibit the same response if submitted to the same circumstances that caused the 
Fukushima disaster. In order to analyze Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s risk in terms of its 
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infrastructures, the function of the boiling water reactor [BWR] employed by both Fukushima 
and Pilgrim will be explained followed by a theoretical application of the sequence of events that 
caused the disaster at Fukushima. Apart from analyzing the disaster at Fukushima, our team also 
analyzed risk factors posed by the large amount of spent fuel stored at Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station. 
The Boiling Water Reactor System 
General Electric created the boiling water reactor in the mid 1950s, and thirty-five GE 
boiling water reactors operate in the United States (Andrews, 2011).  The other sixty-nine 
reactors in the United States use a pressurized water reactor [PWR] (Andrews, 2011).  
 The design of a boiling water reactor is surprisingly simple and can be explained in five steps 
(USNRC, 2012). First, fission reactions take place in the core of the reactor. Nuclear fission is a 
Figure 1. A schematic of commercial boiling water reactors used in the United States (Andrews, 
2011). 
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radioactive decay (See Glossary) of the nucleus (See Glossary) of a heavy isotope (See 
Glossary). The nucleus releases enormous amounts of energy as it decays into smaller more 
stable compounds. Consequently, the energy is released in the form of electromagnetic radiation 
(See Glossary) and kinetic energy (See Glossary) in the form of heat. In the second step, the heat 
produced by the fission reactions in the core is absorbed by high purity water. As a result of 
absorbing heat, the high purity water is converted into a mixture of both steam and water. Next, 
the water is removed from the mixture in a two-step separation (USNRC, 2012). All the water 
must be removed from the steam before it can enter the steam line. In the fourth step, the steam 
line powers a turbine connected to a generator. The turbine activates the generator, and the 
generator produces electricity. Lastly, any unused steam is compressed back into water via a 
condenser. Accordingly, the water from the condenser is pumped back to the reactor where it 
will begin the process again (USNRC, 2012).  
The fission reaction previously described may be stopped for the purpose of maintenance. 
During safe shutdown, the steam line bypasses the turbine. Instead, the steam goes directly to the 
condenser where it will be converted into water for core cooling (Andrews, 2011). When the 
pressure in the reactor reaches approximately 50 pounds per square inch (psi), shutdown-cooling 
mode removes residual heat by means of water and a recirculation loop (Andrews, 2011).  
Despite the term “safe” shutdown, stopping the fission reaction can cause a number of 
accidents. On Tuesday May 22, 2012 at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, a routine shutdown of 
the fission reaction presented a problem (Young, 2012). The whole plant was shut down after a 
condenser lost vacuum pressure. This particular condenser at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station was 
designed to operate in a vacuum to increase efficiency and provide essential cooling to the core 
during shutdown. The condenser’s main function was to cool water removed from the bay and 
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also to convert steam into cooling water.  One the one hand, this shutdown at Pilgrim has been 
viewed as an ominous, foreshadowing event to a future containment failure that could occur if 
Pilgrim were submitted to unplanned reactor shutdown. On the other hand, the shutdown has also 
been viewed in a more positive light. The regulation and testing of the core shutdown process 
illuminates issues that can be corrected. Moreover, Pilgrim representatives assure that every 
shutdown is followed by a rigorous evaluation (Young, 2012).  Nevertheless, the question still 
remains whether Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station would exhibit condenser failure during an 
emergency situation. In spite of the dangers, the fission reaction must be stopped for 
maintenance and calibration. 
Throughout the years, changes have been made to the different systems of the boiling 
water reactor for the purpose of increasing the safety of core shutdown. For example in 1955, 
isolation condensers [IC units] were employed as a backup cooling system in the boiling water 
reactor (Andrews, 2011). Since their establishment, isolation condensers have played a key role 
in core cooling after the reactor is shutdown. IC units are especially useful because they require 
no auxiliary power. As a matter of fact, an operating isolation condenser in Reactor One at 
Fukushima could have prevented the core from melting down. The following year in 1956, the 
emergency core cooling system [ECCS] and the reactor core cooling system [RCIC] were 
employed. Both systems are vital for core cooling (Andrews, 2011). The importance of these 
structural evolutions mentioned above will be elaborated upon in this objective. 
Applying the Disaster Scenario at Fukushima Daiichi to Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station 
At exactly 2:46 pm on March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japans east 
coast (Strickland, 2011). The earthquake occurred almost 100 miles northeast of the Fukushima 
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Daiichi nuclear power plant (Mohrbach, 2011).  At the time of the earthquake, only Reactors 
One, Two, and Three were active.  
As a measure of protection against earthquakes, nuclear power plants subjected to 
seismic activity have different design specifications. The vigorous forces of earthquake motions 
cause safety-related structures to display integral damage in the form of stresses and distortions. 
Moreover, nuclear power plants endangered by earthquake hazard must provide opposition to 
two earthquakes: a system shutdown earthquake [SSE], and operating basis earthquake [OBE] 
(Newmark, Hall, USNRC, 1980). Operating basis earthquakes have a high probability of 
occurring. Fortunately, operating basis earthquakes are lower magnitude and less severe. During 
OBE earthquakes nuclear power plants are able to operate safely. Conversely, a shutdown 
earthquake is a very severe, high magnitude earthquake. Despite being more dangerous, system 
shutdown earthquakes have a very low probability of occurring. During SSE earthquakes, the 
nuclear power plant is automatically shutdown to maintain a safe environment. 
 The 9.0 magnitude earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011 was classified as an 
SSE. Fukushima responded automatically by scramming (See Glossary) the reactors. The 
reactors are scrammed by means of control rods that can generate enormous amounts of heat and 
must be cooled constantly (Strickland, 2011). The earthquake caused a severe power outage. To 
mitigate the loss of power, Fukushima responded immediately with twelve diesel backup 
generators that continued to cool the control and fuel rods. The automatic response to the 
earthquake seemed flawless, but the tsunami that followed changed everything.   
At 2:52, shortly after the fission reactions in the three active reactors were stopped, a 
supervisor noticed that the core of Reactor One was cooling too quickly due to the deployment of 
a backup cooling system (Strickland, 2011). The backup cooling system in Reactor One at 
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Fukushima was an isolation condenser. The particular IC unit located in Reactor One at 
Fukushima had to be manually turned on and off. Subsequently, the need for electric power to 
manipulate the IC unit proved to be a fatal design flaw (Strickland, 2011).  When the operators 
turned off the back up cooling system and could not turn it back on due to the power loss, the 
core of the reactor did not receive proper cooling. As a result, improper cooling caused the 
reactor to eventually melt down (Mohrbach, 2011). 
 The exact type of core meltdown due to partial backup cooling system failure that 
occurred at Fukushima could not occur at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station because they use 
different back up cooling systems. Even though isolation condensers are practical because they 
do not require off-site power, Pilgrim does not employ this system for back up cooling (USNRC, 
2007). Under these circumstances, the cooling system in place would be the reactor core cooling 
system (USNRC, 2007). Isolation condensers and RCIC systems are similar in the way that they 
require no auxiliary power to cool the core of the reactor vessel. However, the reactor core 
cooling system at Pilgrim can be manually turned on by the operator or will turn on 
automatically without off-site or diesel power (Lee, et al, 1994). Therefore, the same issue that 
occurred with the IC unit at Fukushima could not occur at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Above 
all, the lack of an isolation condenser is a decisive difference between the structures that 
contributed to the meltdown at Fukushima; and the structures employed at Pilgrim. 
 About an hour after the earthquake, a tsunami with astonishing 46ft waves moved past 
the protective sea walls (Mohrbach, 2011). The damage caused by tsunamis can compromise the 
structural components of nuclear power plants.  In order to understand effects of a tsunami on a 
nuclear power plant, it is important to understand the mechanisms of tsunamis, and how they are 
created. A tsunami is defined as a water wave formed due to tectonic activity (Jain, Argwhal, 
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Hirani, 2005). The location and specifications of the earthquake directly relate to the 
characteristics of the tsunami that could potentially be generated (USNRC, 2009). First and 
foremost, the location of the earthquake determines whether a tsunami is generated. 
Consequently, only earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 6.5 can generate observable 
tsunamis (USNRC, 2009). Direct flooding, as a result of the tsunami, can cause severe damages 
to a nuclear power plant. Therefore, external and internal flooding design specifications are 
applied to nuclear plants near rivers and coastal areas.  
To protect against tsunamis, Fukushima Daiichi had a total of 32.8ft of protection against 
flood waters (Mohrbach, 2011). However, Fukushima’s 14.1ft elevation was no match for the 
46ft tsunami waves that easily overpowered the 18.7ft levees (Mohrbach, 2011). As a result of 
the insufficient flood protection and design, water from the tsunami disabled eleven of the twelve 
generators and the cooling water pumps at Fukushima (Mohrbach, 2011). Six of the generators 
Figure 2. As a result of the insufficient flood design, this valuable equipment in reactor 
building three was rendered useless (Strickland, 2011). 
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were flooded directly, while the other five were disabled due to flooding in their power 
distribution panels. 
 The loss of these generators caused an entire station blackout. The loss of offsite power 
combined with the loss of diesel power at a nuclear power plant increases the risk of malfunction 
by approximately seventy percent (USNRC, 2005). Complete loss of power is a grave situation 
because the instruments and gauges that provide crucial information about the status of the 
reactor core cannot be used. Although complete station blackouts rarely occur, the operators at 
Fukushima knew the severity of their situation. The location of the twelve diesel generators at 
Fukushima proved to be a critical design flaw. Even more, the only generator that provided 
power continuously throughout the disaster was located on level one near reactor six. After the 
tsunami, the power supplied by the only functional generator at Fukushima prevented reactors 
five and six from going critical (Strickland, 2011).  For this reason, the different locations of the 
backup generators between Pilgrim and Fukushima are a crucial difference between the two 
nuclear power plants. 
 At Fukushima, eleven of the twelve diesel generators were located on the basement level 
of the different reactor buildings. Pilgrim has two diesel generators for the one active reactor on 
site, and they are both located in separate, elevated locations (Eldred, 2012). Pilgrim goes even 
further to protect the fuel source of the generators by housing the fuel piping in underground 
water tight vaults (Eldred, 2012). To further reduce the risk of a complete station blackout, 
Pilgrim has a third station blackout generator. This station blackout generator is also located in a 
watertight, elevated location. In the event that Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station lost power and 
both diesel generators were destroyed, the third station blackout generator would maintain safe 
function of the plant (T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012). 
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After completing a comprehensive study of the disaster by means of interviews with 
members of the Toykyo Electric Power Company [TEPCO], Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial 
safety Agency, USNRC, International Atomic Energy Agency, local governments, and by 
reading hundreds of reports, Eliza Strickland speculates, “Some of these [system failures] are 
astonishingly simple: If the emergency generators had been installed on upper floors rather than 
in basements, for example, the disaster would have stopped before it began”(Strickland, 2011). 
An evaluation of the disaster at Fukushima compared with the structural differences of power 
plants in Germany completed by Ludger Mohrbach supports Strickland’s claim naming the 
location of the generators as one of the most critical weak points at Fukushima Daiichi 
(Mohrbach, 2011). Tom Setzer, a Senior Reactor Inspector for the USNRC, agreed with 
Strickland’s claim. When questioned about the disaster, Setzer reiterated that functional diesel 
generators could have entirely prevented the disaster (T.Setzer, personal communication, 
October 3, 2012). The differences between Pilgrim and Fukushima’s generators are a major 
structural differences that drastically reduce Pilgrim’s risk for the same exact disaster. 
Regarding safety component failure at Fukushima, the loss of the cooling water pumps as 
a result of the flooding was another crucial system malfunction that took place. The cooling 
water pumps provided a crucial system called an ultimate heat sink (See Glossary) (A. 
Gunderson, personal communication, 2012). An ultimate heat sink is essentially an endless 
supply of water for core cooling during shutdown. As a direct result of the destruction of both the 
generators and the cooling water pumps, the supply of cooling water available to cool the core of 
Reactor One at Fukushima was drastically limited. The ultimate heat sink at Pilgrim is called salt 
service water [SSW] and has five vertical pumps that draw water from the Cape Cod Bay 
(USNRC, 2007). The SSW consists of two open loops, and each loop requires two pumps. In the 
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event of a loss of coolant accident [LOCA], only one loop of SSW is required to properly cool 
the core of the reactor. Pilgrim has a backup cooling water loop and a common spare in the event 
of a core shutdown (USNRC, 2007). Based on the structural differences between the generators 
and the cooling pumps at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant, the exact same cooling failure could not occur at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.  
Approximately two hours after the earthquake, Reactor One at Fukushima began 
experiencing cooling issues. The cooling issues started with the backup cooling system, but new 
malfunctions were discovered in another part of Reactor One. After the tsunami disabled the 
diesel generators at Fukushima, the blackout DC batteries were powering the turbo pumps. 
However, DC batteries die after roughly eight hours (T. Setzer, personal communication, 
Figure 3. Temporary batteries were used to read crucial instruments throughout the station 
blackout (Strickland, 2011). 
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October 3, 2012). After they die, the DC batteries cannot properly cool the core of a nuclear 
reactor. As a consequence of improper cooling, temperatures in Reactor One at Fukushima 
exceeded 900°C (Mohrbach, 2011).  The extreme temperature caused the zirconium alloy 
cladding (See Glossary) in the fuel rods to react. This reaction was an exothermic (See 
Glossary), oxidation reaction (See Glossary). Exothermic reactions are chemical reactions that 
release energy in the form of heat or light. Alternatively, oxidation reactions increase the 
oxidation state of the compound and release hydrogen. The combination of these two reactions 
caused a layer of hydrogen gas to begin forming in the building of Reactor One at Fukushima 
(Strickland, 2011). 
At approximately eleven the night of March 11, 2011, the radiation levels inside the 
building of Reactor One became too high for workers to enter (Strickland, 2011).  The radiation 
level had increased because the core had started melting as a result of improper cooling and the 
dangerous reactions mentioned in the previous paragraph (Strickland, 2011). For this reason, the 
workers at Fukushima tried to release the pressure on Reactor One. Unfortunately, the 
replacement of back up cooling by means of water injection had been started too late because of 
the station blackout (Mohrbach, 2011). By the time the workers had connected car batteries to 
the primary containment pressure gauge in Reactor One, they learned the vessel was already 
operating at maximum capacity and could explode (Strickland, 2011).  Because of the lack of 
proper cooling, the pelleted fuel that built up in the fuel cans prevented the flow of more fuel 
(Mohrbach, 2011). Subsequently, the buildup in the fuel cans compressed and melted. The 
containment of Reactor One at Fukushima suffered three partial failures: the fuel itself, the fuel 
rod claddings, and the third containment barrier (Mohrbach, 2011).  
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At 3:45am on March 12
th
, the crew working on Reactor One needed to get a measure of 
the radiation levels (Strickland, 2011). As a preparatory measure, the crew took iodine tablets 
and dressed in head to toe suits before they entered reactor building one. In addition, the crew 
was also equipped with dosimeters. Dosimeters are hand held devices that measure radiation 
levels, but the crew was not able to use the devices. When the crew opened the airlock to Reactor 
One, they saw what they thought could be an enormous amount radioactive steam (Strickland, 
2011). Almost as soon as the airlock had been opened, it was slammed shut by the crew, and 
they left without a radiation level reading. Despite not getting a reading of the radiation levels at 
that time, they were aware that the situation was critical.  If the crew had been able to look inside 
the pressure vessel of Reactor One just a few hours later, they would have seen a melted mixture 
of zirconium and uranium (Strickland, 2011).  This volatile mixture was what was left of the core 
of Reactor One. As a result of the improper cooling, there was immense pressure on Reactor 
One; and the crew knew they had to relieve the pressure as soon as possible. Around midnight 
the night before, the government had received word from TEPCO that in order to save Reactor 
One they would have release radioactive material (Strickland, 2011).  
 At 9:03am on March 12
th
, the crew at Fukushima received word that residents within 10 
km had been evacuated, and they could begin to relieve the pressure in reactor one (Strickland, 
2011).  Relieving the pressure in Reactor One seemed as simple as releasing the valves, but the 
dangerous radiation levels presented a new issue.  Workers in a nuclear power plant under 
normal conditions are permitted to receive 50 millisievets of radiation per year (Strickland, 
2011). If the situation is critical, a worker is permitted to receive 100 millisievets of radiation per 
year.  Workers entered the building to release the valve, but they were unable to complete this 
task because of the high radiation levels.  With this in mind, the decision was made to force the 
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valve open with a portable air compressor. Meanwhile, the hydrogen build up had started during 
core heat up and formed a dangerous layer under the building of Reactor One. Accordingly, 
hydrogen recombiners take combustible hydrogen gas and convert if back into steam.  By 
3:30pm the pressure had appeared to be relieved, but the release in pressure was hydrogen 
flowing through the venting stacks and building up the outer ceiling in reactor building one 
(Strickland, 2011).  Six short minutes later, a spark ignited the hydrogen and the top of reactor 
building one was blown off in an explosion. Unfortunately, Reactor One was not the only reactor 
at Fukushima to explode and release radioactive material. In total, Reactors One, Two, Three, 
and Four experienced massive hydrogen explosions releasing enormous amounts of radioactive 
material (USNRC, 2011d). The majority of the radioactive material released in the disaster at 
Fukushima consisted of Iodine, Cesium, Strontium, and Plutonium (Winter, 2011).  TEPCO 
grossly underestimated the amount of radioactive material release after the disaster (Demetriou, 
2011). In spite of all this, the radiation did not harm the surrounding areas to the extent that it 
could have because approximately eighty percent of the total radioactive emissions were blown 
over the Pacific Ocean (A. Gunderson, personal communication, 2012). 
After the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, the USNRC immediately performed inspections 
at all United States nuclear power plants (T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012). 
The inspection at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station was performed approximately a month after the 
accident, and the objective of the inspection was to determine if Pilgrim could alleviate the 
events that occurred at Fukushima (USNRC, 2011d). The inspection assessed Pilgrim’s ability to 
mitigate the consequences of large fires and explosions, station blackout conditions [SBO], 
internal and external flooding, and the thoroughness of the emergency response procedures 
(USNRC, 2011d).   
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When evaluating the fire protection capabilities at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 
emphasis was placed by the USNRC on the spent fuel structure (USNRC, 2011d). The spent fuel 
structure is fully elaborated upon on page 23. With respect to fire protection and explosions, 
Entergy performed equipment inventory of necessary operational tools. After the inventory, 
Entergy performed a test of a portable diesel powered pump (USNRC, 2011d). The inspector 
from the USNRC independently assessed interior fire water supply piping and hose stations, 
portable pump, associated suction discharge hoses, adapters, portable DC power supplies, 
portable radios, and equipment lockers involved in fire protection (USNRC, 2011d). Neither 
Entergy nor the inspector from the USNRC found any major deficiencies with Pilgrim’s 
capabilities to relieve large fires or explosions. 
A safety evaluation performed by the USNRC in 2007 mentioned the nuclear plant 
previously employed an electrolytic hydrogen water chemistry system to remove dangerous 
gases that could cause an explosion (USNRC, 2007). However, Entergy requested that the 
system be excluded from the license renewal as of July 31, 2006 (USNRC, 2007). The 
electrolytic hydrogen water chemistry system was used to prevent the build of dangerous 
hydrogen and oxygen mixtures. When the USNRC questioned Entergy about the removal of the 
electrolytic hydrogen water chemistry system, Entergy responded that the heating, venting and 
air conditioning [HVAC] system in the turbine building mitigate dangerous hydrogen mixtures. 
In addition to the HVAC system in the turbine building, Entergy explained that any hydrogen 
leak that could cause a fire or detonate would not affect the system piping or safety components 
because they are at an adequate distance. For this reason, the USNRC accepted the response 
from Entergy and excluded this system from the license renewal on August 30, 2006 (USNRC, 
2007).  
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Pilgrim’s ability to mitigate station blackout conditions was evaluated after the fire 
protection assessment reported no major deficiencies. Entergy evaluated the SBO diesel 
generator [DG] and SBO control stations (USNRC, 2011d).  The USNRC inspector accompanied 
by an electrical design engineer and a responsible system engineer (see glossary) conducted an 
independent inspection of the SBO diesel generator and SBO control stations (USNRC, 2011d). 
The USNRC inspector found two minor problems during the investigation. The inspector 
concluded SBO diesel generator cooling radiator could be damaged by flying debris from high 
winds (USNRC, 2011d). In response to this, Entergy issued a corrective action to fix the 
problem. Regarding the second minor issue, the inspector found that the switchgear battery was 
not restrained in a battery rack (USNRC,2011d). Entergy responded again with corrective action. 
The specific corrective actions regarding the minor deficiencies mentioned cannot be publically 
accessed, but the corrective action identification orders are listed at the end report. 
After the station blackout conditions were evaluated, the next inspection was to test 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Stations ability to mitigate internal and external flooding. The United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission offered a document containing the guidelines for adverse 
weather protection in nuclear power plants. The guidelines for a nuclear power plant to cope with 
external flooding include: an evaluation of the licensees design for flood levels with special 
arrangements for areas containing safety related equipment, a structural design according to the 
propensity for flood to occur at the licensee location supplemented by weather related 
information in that selected area, and a walk down (See Glossary) conducted by both the licensee 
and a USNRC inspector (USNRC, 2010). Entergy completed a walk down of the specific areas 
designed to mitigate internal and external flooding and reported no major deficiencies (USNRC, 
2011d). After, An inspector from the USNRC accompanied by a structural engineer surveyed 
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Pilgrims ECCS pumps, RCIC cooling room, turbine building room, control rod drive room, 
intake structures, surface water pump rooms, and the emergency diesel generator rooms with 
respect to the systems and structures ability to alleviate internal and external flooding (USNRC, 
2011d). Neither the USNRC inspector nor the structural engineer found any issues with Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station’s flood design (USNRC, 2011d). 
The last parameter in the inspection was assessing the adequacy of the comprehensive 
emergency management system. Entergy tested this procedure by asking engineers and operators 
to perform specific procedures (USNRC, 2011d). Additionally, the inspector from the USNRC 
reviewed Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s transition into Emergency Operating Procedures 
[EOP] (USNRC, 2011d). The inspector from the USNRC concluded that the review was 
sufficient, and no corrective action was needed with regards to emergency procedure. 
 In spite of the USNRC’s thorough inspection of Pilgrim after Fukushima, the validity of 
the USNRC’s documents is now being called into question; notably by Richard H. Perkins, a risk 
and reliability engineer for the agency, who spoke to Huffington Post about a suspected cover up 
by USNRC of nuclear vulnerabilities (Zeller, 2012).. Recently, a nuclear risk engineer working 
for the USNRC spoke out about a redacted inspection in which data was purposely omitted 
because of its significance (Zeller, 2012). After the meltdown at Fukushima, the USNRC 
conducted inspections to determine whether power stations operating in the United States could 
mitigate the destructive combination of events that caused a disaster at Fukushima. Specifically, 
the vulnerabilities consist of flood risks in power stations located downstream from dams (Zeller, 
2012). Moreover, the complete failure of the dam due to any number of reasons could simulate 
the flooding experienced at Fukushima (Zeller, 2012).  The flooding at Fukushima caused the 
backup diesel generators to fail leading to an entire station blackout. Furthermore, nuclear power 
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station blackouts can initiate or augment any current system failures and severely compromise 
the workers ability to safely maintain the function of the power plant. Perkins elaborated upon 
the USNRC removing the information about the threat posed by dams; even more how the 
USNRC struggled to give a reason about why the information was removed (Zeller, 2012). The 
Huffington report concluded that the risk posed by dams is higher than acceptable. The USNRC 
assured there is an ongoing investigation being conducted. Nonetheless, the USNRC covering up 
information of any sort raises red flags because of important position they hold with respect to 
nuclear power. Above all, the USNRC is essentially responsible for regulation of all matters 
concerning nuclear power in the United States and can be directly liable for any harm done to the 
environment and human beings.  
 Spent Fuel at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 
The spent fuel pool at Pilgrim has a large concrete base; the concrete base, which is is 
plated with stainless steel. Inside the concrete base, storage racks form a square grid. These 
storage racks are made of a material called Boraflex (USNRC, 2007). Boron is the active 
component of the Boraflex. When fuel assemblies are placed in the square grid formed by the 
storage racks, they are still radioactive. For this reason, the Boron is needed to remove the 
radioactive neutrons (See Glossary) from the fuel assemblies. Apart from being radioactive, the 
fuel assemblies placed in the spent fuel pool are also very hot because of their decay heat (See 
Glossary)(T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012).  To cool the fuel assemblies 
added to the spent fuel pool, very pure water is cycled through the spent fuel pool at Pilgrim by 
the SSW (USNRC, 2007).   
The spent fuel pool at Pilgrim has the capacity to hold 1000 fuel assemblies, and the 
reactor core at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station has roughly 580 fuel assemblies(T.Setzer, personal 
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communication, October 3, 2012). Approximately every 18-24 months, roughly 194 fuel 
assemblies in the reactor core at Pilgrim must be removed and placed in a spent fuel 
pool(T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012). This process is called a fuel outage 
(See Glossary). Fuel outages are completely necessary for the reactor to function properly, but 
this process fills the spent fuel pool in a matter of years. The storage racks in the spent fuel pool 
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have been reracked to provide more space, but according to 
(T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012) there will be no more space after the next 
fuel outage.  
While spent fuel pools are only a temporary means of storage for the fuel assemblies, dry 
cask storage provides a more permanent solution. The casks are between eighteen to twenty feet  
 
Figure 4. An example of the dry cask 
storage structurs currently being built at 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Entergy, 
2012). 
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tall and are eleven feet in diameter(Entergy, 2012). Additionally, the casks can hold up to three 
hundred thousand pounds and require no electricity (Entergy, 2012). Approximately thirteen 
nuclear power plants across the United States use dry cask storage as a form of permanent spent 
fuel storage, and there has never been a crack or leak of radioactive material recorded with this 
type of storage (Entergy, 2012). Pilgrim recently licensed the company Holtec to begin building 
dry cask storage structures (T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012). In fact, Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station must have the dry cask storage up and running within the next few years 
because they are running out of space in their spent fuel pool (T.Setzer, personal communication, 
October 3, 2012). 
 While dry cask storage is a safer means of storage in terms of Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station’s current spent fuel situation, it is not a feasible solution for all nuclear power plants. In 
the opinion of Thomas Setzer, during the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear operators were under the 
impression that by the millennium there would be a permanent nuclear repository (See Glossary) 
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(T.Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 2012).
 
Figure 5. Percentage of spent fuel pools at capacity over time. 
The figure illustrates the dire need for a permanent spent fuel site. In spite of the spent fuel pools 
across the United States quickly reaching their capacity, the focus of nuclear power industry is 
still on building new nuclear plants. Under these circumstances, the nuclear power industry 
should shift their focus to developing a plan to remedy the dangerous spent fuel situation. 
The Impact of Catastrophic Failure 
The disaster at Fukushima resonated throughout the world. For example, the United 
Kingdom’s government was perplexed when six nuclear power companies announced they 
would no longer be funding nuclear plants. In addition to that, Germany recently passed the 
Nuclear Energy Act. This act declares that Germany will phase out of nuclear energy by 2022 
(BBC Monitoring Europe, 2012). After Germany’s announcement, one of Scotland’s nuclear 
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operators announced a similar decision to abandon their nuclear power projects (BBC 
Monitoring Europe, 2012). The stepping away from nuclear power plants as an energy source 
has stimulated a number of opinions in both opposition and favor of nuclear power. 
As a result of passing the Nuclear Energy act, Germany faces the daunting task of 
dismantling their reactors. Dismantling nuclear reactors is very expensive. The German 
government has set aside 1.9 billion euros for the dismantling of the reactors Brunsbuettel, and 
this base cost to decommission the nuclear reactors has posed major issues. Aside from the 
reactors Brunsbuettel, nine other nuclear reactors in Germany also need to be shut down because 
of the nuclear energy act. The estimate for the decommissioning of these nuclear plants is in the 
tens of billions of dollars. Despite the issues surrounding Germany's nuclear power plants, the 
Nuclear Energy Act presents the nuclear operators with two options for the decommission. 
Option one is a "safe enclosure". A safe enclosure of a nuclear power plant is the least expensive 
option. Unfortunately, mothballing (See Glossary) a site renders it uninhabitable for decades. 
The second option involves immediate dismantling of the reactor. However, this option is 
estimated to cost billions and take at least a decade.  Another issue surrounding the second 
option is the lack of experience in dismantling nuclear reactors. Germany has an estimated 
sixteen nuclear power stations set for decommissioning; however the reactors at each station are 
extremely different (The Scotsman, 2012). Because the reactors are so different from each other, 
there is no accepted procedure on how to decommission them.  
In spite of Germany’s plans to abandon nuclear power, Japan recently decided not to 
move away from nuclear power. After the accident at Fukushima, Japanese officials originally 
set a goal declaring they would phase out of nuclear power by 2040 (Hiroko, 2012).  However, 
intense opposition stopped the goal from being formally adopted. Businesses and communities 
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throughout Japan protested the move away from nuclear power because they did not want to lose 
the subsides, tax revenues, and jobs provided indirectly by nuclear power (Hiroko, 2012). A 
Plymouth local has the same view. Allan Burgess stated that if Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 
were shut down the taxes would increase so much that he and his family would have to move (A. 
Burgess, personal communication, 2012).  
The communities and businesses of Japan do not only fear the economic repercussions of 
a nuclear phase out. They also do not want their offline nuclear power plants to become spent 
fuel storage sites (Hiroko, 2012). To prevent their offline nuclear power plants from becoming 
spent fuel repositories, Japanese officials announced the decision not to move away from nuclear 
power. In spite of this decision, the accident at Fukushima showed that the close relationship 
between the supposed regulators of the nuclear industry and those who operate the nuclear plants 
needed to be terminated. So when the Japanese government made the announcement not to phase 
nuclear power, they also announced the creation and installment of a new nuclear regulation 
agency (Hiroko, 2012). By means of strict federal regulation, the Japanese government hopes to 
once again make nuclear power a success in their country.  
Spread of radiation around Fukushima 
In order to determine the magnitude of the effects a nuclear disaster at Pilgrim would 
have on the surrounding area, it is important to measure the radiation levels at certain distances 
from the Fukushima disaster site and compare this data to corresponding distances from Pilgrim. 
Information on the basic definition of radiation can be found in the appendix at the end of this 
report.  This will give us an approximation of how far dangerous amounts of fallout could spread 
and what areas of Massachusetts and Rhode Island could be affected.  The figures below show 
radiation concentration data around the Fukushima Nuclear Generating Station following the 
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disaster on March 11, 2011.  The first figure shows readings at monitoring posts around 
Fukushima taken on April 16, while the second figure depicts a graphic representation of 
readings taken on April 29.  We can use these data points to estimate the radiation levels at 
similar locations with respect to the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station. 
 
Figure 6. Readings at monitoring post out of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP.  This figure shows 
radiation levels measured at monitoring posts near the Fukushima Daiichi disaster site on April 
16, 2011 (Zeiss, 2011). 
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Figure 7. Arial Measuring Results. This figure shows a graphical representation of the measured 
radiation near the Fukushima Daiichi disaster site (Sandeen, 2011). 
 
Radiation levels 10 kilometers northwest of Fukushima Daiichi were measured at more 
than 40 uSv/hour (microSieverts per hour), or 0.350 Sv /year, which is nearly 120 times normal 
background radiation level of 3 mSv/year (Wang, 2011).  Radiation levels 20 kilometers 
northwest of Fukushima were measured at about half that, however this is still 60 times normal 
background radiation levels.  At 80 kilometers from Fukushima Daiichi, radiation levels were 
measured at less than 0.01 Sv/year.  Though this is only three times normal radiation levels, this 
statistic shows that the disaster at Fukushima had a noticeable radiological impact on the 
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environment 80 kilometers away from the site.  The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Committee (NAIIC) reports that more than 1800 square kilometers are contaminated with a 
cumulative dose of 5 mSv/year or more (National Diet of Japan, 2012). 
Risks of radiation exposure 
Radiation stays within the body, so it accumulates over time (Caldicott, 2011).  Being 
exposed to radiation for prolonged periods of time causes irreversible damage to the body.  
According to the figure below, living within this radius greatly increases risk of death over time 
and may quickly cause radiation sickness and poisoning.  This figure demonstrates that cancer is 
possible at 50 mSv, which would accumulate after only four to five months of exposure 20 miles 
from the plant and just two months of exposure 10 miles from the plant. 
Radiation levels directly inside the basement of reactor 1 at Fukushima were measured at 
10,300 mSv/hr which is enough to kill a human being within hours (MarketWatch, 2012).  One 
quarter of a mile from Fukushima, radiation levels were measured at 1 mSv/hr, which could 
cause cancer in a human being within several days.  (New York Times, 2011).   
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Figure 8. Effects of radiation. This figure demonstrates the dosages of radiation administered by 
certain scenarios as well as dosages required to cause different levels of radiation poisoning. 
(Wang, 2011). 
  
Possible spread of radiation around Pilgrim 
 Wind speed and direction are important determinants in how radiation is spread over a 
region.  Fortunately for Japanese residents, at the time of the Fukushima disaster winds headed 
east carried the majority of the radiation towards the Pacific Ocean and away from civilization, 
though unfavorable winds began to carry radiation inland several days after the disaster 
(Kitamoto, 2011).  Since we cannot predict exactly how the wind might behave at specific dates 
in the future, we must examine some of the worst case scenarios in order to determine whether 
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the current disaster plan is appropriate for such situations. One particular case would be if the 
wind were to be directed south during the time of a disaster at Pilgrim.  This would spread 
significant amounts of radiation across southern Plymouth and Barnstable counties, potentially 
cutting off all road access to Cape Cod, leaving hundreds of thousands of residents stranded.  
This unique case will be discussed in a later chapter.  Another important case to examine would 
be if radiation spread toward either one of the nearby city centers of Boston or Providence.  Both 
of these large cities are located close enough to Plymouth that the proper wind conditions could 
contaminate either of these cities with unsafe levels of radiation and pose health risks to 
hundreds of thousands of people.  We will also be examining this scenario in a later chapter. 
Disaster response and evacuation 
 By observing the successes and failures of how the Fukushima disaster was handled, we 
can better understand what procedures and regulations must be in place to effectively minimize 
the repercussions of a disaster at Pilgrim.  There are many ways in which the Fukushima disaster 
could have been better handled.  Many mistakes were made that could have been easily 
prevented.  We can learn from these mistakes so that disaster planning and response at Pilgrim 
can be more comprehensive and successful. 
Government Response 
The first evacuation orders for citizens within a two kilometer radius of Fukushima 
Daiichi were not given until 8:50 PM, followed by a three kilometer evacuation order at 9:23 
PM. The Prime Minister ordered a 10 kilometer evacuation at 5:44 AM on March 12 which was 
extended to 20 kilometers at 6:25 PM (Japan Nuclear Technology Institute, 2011).  Fukushima’s 
governor Yuhei Sato, at a hearing by the Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission (NAIIC), stated that Japan’s central government did not declare an emergency until 
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two and a half hours after they received the initial report from TEPCO (Yomiuri, 2012).  
Furthermore, the Fukushima prefecture government did not receive notice of the disaster from 
the central government for another hour after that (Yomiuri, 2012).  The earthquake and tsunami 
caused massive blackouts across the eastern coast of Japan, which in turn disabled many of the 
emergency response systems and organizations (National Diet of Japan, 2012).  One of the 
primary systems that were disabled was the off-site Emergency Response Center (ERC) which 
was supposed to be used to communicate with the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).  
The main organizations of the government’s emergency response plan that were in charge of 
coordinating all emergency response measures were the Prime Minister’s Nuclear Emergency 
Response Headquarters, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of 
NISA, and the Regional Nuclear Emergency Response team.  The NAIIC concludes based on 
their interviews and findings that overall, none of these organizations functioned as planned.  All 
of the emergency response organizations that were not dedicated nuclear disaster response 
organizations, such as the Crisis Management Center, were already too busy with the earthquake 
and tsunami to divert any attention towards the nuclear disaster. The failure of communication 
between the central and local governments forced the Fukushima prefecture government to make 
their own decision to evacuate without approval from the central government.  When the central 
government announced their own orders for evacuation, these two different orders given by 
different governments caused mass confusion among Japanese citizens and many people were 
still unaware of what they were supposed to do (National Diet of Japan, 2012). 
TEPCO’s Response 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the owner of the Fukushima plant, also had a 
difficult time making decisions and relaying information because the chain of command was 
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severely disrupted due to the fact that most of the officials charged with making decisions, such 
as TEPCO’s chairman and president, and Fukushima Daiichi’s general manager, were 
unreachable.  In addition, TEPCO’s manual describing emergency response procedures was 
outdated and completely ineffective.  This resulted in many conflicting orders, which in turn only 
heightened the confusion of the emergency responders.  Many of the issues faced by the 
Fukuhsima Nuclear Power Plant were caused by a failure to account for a disaster of this 
magnitude.  Almost all of the regulations in place were based on precedent, and did not protect 
the facility against a natural disaster larger than any that had occurred previously in history.  
Although there were many safety regulations in place that would have been effective in the event 
of a small disaster, most were rendered useless due to the blackout caused by the earthquake and 
tsunami (National Diet of Japan, 2012).  This complete failure of the emergency response system 
can be linked to widespread communication and management failures by TEPCO and the local 
and central governments of Japan.  Had any of the organizations and governing bodies been 
prepared to handle a disaster of this magnitude with detailed, functional, and up to date 
instructions and emergency response plans, the severity of the radiation leak could have been 
minimized, if not avoided completely. 
Evacuation Response at Fukushima 
The evacuation of Fukushima was chaotic to say the least.  At 8:50 PM March 11, the 
Fukushima prefecture government ordered a two kilometer evacuation based on their prior 
training experience.  At 9:23 PM March 11, the central government ordered a three kilometer 
evacuation.  The 10 kilometer evacuation was not announced until 5:44 AM the next morning 
and the 20 kilometer evacuation was announced at 6:25 PM.  The severe infrastructure damage 
from the earthquake and tsunami slowed the relay of these announcements to local municipalities 
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and citizens.  Many residents were not even aware of the evacuation orders until several days 
after the disaster.  The NAIIC determined that 146,520 residents were relocated in total.  Due to 
the numerous revisions in evacuation orders, thousands of these evacuees were relocated more 
than once, causing much confusion and stress.  Many of the hospitals and nursing homes had 
difficulty relocating due to a lack of transportation.  Sixty deaths among hospital patients in 
March were directly linked to the evacuation difficulties  (National Diet of Japan, 2012).  The 20 
to 30 kilometer zone was declared a voluntary evacuation zone, so it was entirely up to the 
residents to decide whether to relocate or shelter in place.  Unfortunately, most of these people 
had very little information on the nature and severity of the disaster so they had to make this 
decision with little to no facts.  It can be concluded that TEPCO and the Japanese government 
were all extremely unprepared for a disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant.  They failed 
to account for a large disaster, failed to keep safety procedures and manuals up to date, failed to 
react to the disaster timely and efficiently, failed to announce evacuation orders when the 
disaster was known, and failed to protect the health and safety of Japanese citizens near the 
power plant. 
Emergency Plan for Pilgrim 
The evacuation plan at Pilgrim is designed and executed by the Nuclear Preparedness 
Department (NPD) of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).  They are 
responsible for designing evacuation procedures, training emergency responders, and 
maintaining equipment for the ten mile Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) in Massachusetts.  
This includes not only Pilgrim, but parts of Vermont Yankee and Seabrook in New Hampshire as 
well since their 10 mile emergency planning zones overlap into Massachusetts (Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, 2012).  The EPZ surrounding Pilgrim includes the towns of Plymouth, 
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Kingston, Duxbury, and portions of Carver and Marshfield (Entergy, 2011).  The plan covers 
reception centers, Radiological Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Stations 
(RWEMDS), and transportation for schools, licensed day care facilities, children's camps, 
nursing homes, hospitals, group homes, and correctional facilities.  The Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan also includes services such as environmental monitoring, public alerting, special 
needs assistance, crisis counseling, meal accommodations for evacuees, business restoration 
assistance, and many others.  The training department offers training to the approximately 4700 
emergency responders for Pilgrim and conducts federally evaluated emergency exercises every 
two years (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2012).   
Evacuation Plan for Pilgrim 
Entergy, the owner and operator of the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, has outlined 
the basics of the procedures for emergency preparedness and evacuation on their website.  The 
emergency plan in place around Pilgrim details an evacuation radius of 10 miles as required by 
the NRC (Entergy, 2011).  According to the 2010 US Census, there are more than 75,000 people 
living within this potentially hazardous zone (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  The Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) reports that there are also 21 public schools and 1 hospital 
located within this zone (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2012).  In order to notify the 
public of a nuclear threat, Entergy owns and operates 112 emergency sirens within a 10 mile 
radius of the plant.  These sirens will alert residents that there is a potential threat, and residents 
are instructed to tune to one of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) Radio Stations.  The 
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is divided into twelve subareas as shown in the figure below, 
each containing a designated evacuation route to one of the three Reception Centers outside of 
the EPZ (Entergy, 2011). There is also coordination with the Massachusetts Department of 
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Public Health's Radiation Control Program to protect the food supply within the 50 mile radius, 
also known as the Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ) (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2012). 
 
Figure 9. Emergency planning zone. This figure depicts the 12 different subareas, evacuation 
routes, and reception centers designated in the evacuation plan for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Plant (Entergy, 2011). 
Complications with Pilgrim’s Evacuation Plan  
This evacuation plan relocates everyone within a 10 mile radius to reception zones just 
outside of this 10 mile radius.  While biennial exercises show that this plan may be adequate for 
evacuating this ten mile radius, a major disaster causing unforeseen circumstances like what 
occurred at Fukushima would affect a much larger area and this plan would quickly fail.  Most of 
the reception zones are still within 20 miles of Pilgrim, which allows the possibility that these 
reception zones are still within an area at risk for dangerous levels of radiation.  Fukushima had a 
similar plan in place with reception zones and emergency radiation treatment facilities 
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immediately outside of the planned evacuation radius, though unfortunately due to the unplanned 
expansion of the evacuation zone, most of these facilities were never used (National Diet of 
Japan, 2012).  It can easily be predicted that Pilgrim would encounter a similar situation if the 
evacuation radius were to be expanded beyond the planned 10 miles during a disaster situation.  
Radiation levels measured in Japan led the US State Department to recommend a 50 mile 
evacuation radius in Japan.  The figure below shows the 10, 20 and 50 mile radii around Pilgrim.  
It is evident how large of an area would be affected if a disaster similar to Fukushima were to 
occur at Pilgrim. 
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Figure 10. Eastern Massachusetts. This figure shows the 10, 20, and 50 mile radii centered on the 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, as well as the population within these radii from the 2010 Census 
(Capedownwinders, 2012). 
The red circle represents the area of Massachusetts that is planned to evacuate in the 
event of a nuclear disaster at Pilgrim.  The yellow circle represents the approximate area required 
to evacuate around Fukushima due to the disaster, while the white circle represents the area 
around Fukushima that the US recommended to be evacuated.  It is evident from this map that 
the evacuation plan for Pilgrim needs to be reevaluated to accommodate for a larger disaster.  
Evacuating a larger region would require many additional resources such as an increase in the 
number of Reception Centers outside of the evacuation radius, coordination and increase of 
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public transportation, multiple/alternative evacuation routes and improved communication 
between public safety officials.  An attempt at evacuating this large region without a proper 
evacuation procedure in place would be extremely difficult to say the least. 
Cape Cod 
Cape Cod presents Massachusetts with a unique challenge in disaster planning.  The 
entire Cape Cod region falls within 50 miles of the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station. Cape 
Cod has a year round population of approximately 220,000 and during the summer months 
tourism causes this population to nearly triple to over 650,000 residents and tourists on any given 
day (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  Since the Cape does not fall within the 10 mile radius of the 
plant, there is no predetermined evacuation plan in place.  If a disaster were to occur that would 
require the evacuation of the cape, there are several issues that will need to be addressed.  One 
primary concern is that there are only two bridges that cross the Cape Cod Canal – The 
Sagamore Bridge on Route 6 and the Bourne Bridge on Route.  Each bridge is designed for four 
lanes of traffic – two inbound lanes and two outbound lanes (United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, n.d.).  Given a worst case scenario of a disaster happening during the peak tourism 
months, these 8 total lanes of traffic can be converted to all outbound traffic and would be the 
only land evacuation route for more than 600,000 people.  However, this brings up the concern 
that the Bourne Bridge is 16 miles from Pilgrim and the Sagamore Bridge is only 13 miles from 
Pilgrim.  Bottlenecking traffic so close to the source of the radiation would be a severe hazard to 
all evacuees.  Although this concern has been acknowledged by the NRC, an alternative plan has 
not been determined (Cassidy, 2012).  If the wind during the time of a disaster were to be 
directed toward the south at all, this could cause extremely unsafe radiation levels along both of 
these evacuation routes potentially requiring them to be shut down completely.  This scenario 
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provokes the need for alternative nuclear disaster preparations to protect the hundreds of 
thousands of people threatened by this risk. 
Boston/Providence 
The city of Boston is just 35 miles from the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and 
Providence, Rhode Island is 36 miles from Pilgrim.  These heavily populated cities have close 
enough proximity to Pilgrim that they are both potentially at risk for significant radiation 
contamination.  While this risk is extremely small, it is still a possibility and needs to be taken 
into consideration for Pilgrim’s disaster plan.  Based on the highest radiation readings 35 to 36 
miles from Fukushima, a disaster at Pilgrim would not warrant an evacuation of either of these 
cities, however residents should be aware that a disaster would put them at risk for higher than 
normal radiation levels and should also be aware of what the health implications involved are. 
Radiation from Power Plants 
Nuclear power plants expel a variety of radioactive particles including gamma ray, alpha 
particle, and beta particle emitting radioactive isotopes. The radioactive particles that are emitted 
Figure 11. Path of fallout. This figure demonstrates some 
of the paths radioactive fallout takes to enter the 
environment and human food sources (UNSCEAR, 2011). 
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from nuclear power plants differ significantly from the type that is generated from atomic 
bombs. Victims of atomic bombs are usually exposed to a single, large dose of gamma rays and 
neutrons.  Alternatively, most of the total exposure to radiation from reactor accidents comes 
from the fallout (Wiliams, E. D., 2006). The significant particles in the fallout from Chernobyl 
were the radioactive isotopes, iodine-131 and cesium-137. The significance of these particles 
comes from their interaction with the human body (United Nations Scientific Committee on the 
Effects of Atomic Radiation [UNSCEAR], 2011). Figure 11 from the UNSCEAR report 
demonstrates the path of fallout after an accident at a nuclear power plant. There are several 
different possibilities, but much of the fallout can end up into human food sources especially 
grass-grazing livestock. The fallout can spread over vast areas because it can travel large 
distances in the atmosphere before coming down as contaminated rain. 
 
Radiation and Living Systems 
When explaining how radiation affects living systems it is simplest to describe what 
happens when a cell, the simplest unit of life, is hit with a radiation. Alpha particles can be 
thought of as molecular bullets. They are large and will go through a cell destroying molecules in 
their path. This includes DNA, which is the genetic material of the cell. If DNA is significantly 
damaged it results in cell death, and if DNA is only slightly damaged it can lead to a mutation 
that generates a cancer cell. Gamma rays and beta particles can be thought of in a similar way 
though they work through chemical means. The end effect is cell damage and potentially cancer. 
Not all cells that are hit with radiation will become cancerous, but there is a chance. For this 
reason, it is better for living systems to not be exposed to radiation. (Jefferson Lab, 2012). 
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Environment 
Historically environmental harm has been an accepted consequence of the development 
of energy, but how much harm is unjustifiable? This section considers the harm done to the 
Massachusetts’ ecosystem from nuclear energy and the potential harm that could be done in the 
event of a Fukushima level disaster with a special focus on how the fish and shellfish population 
are affected by the plant. 
It is difficult to determine the exact scope of the effects the accident at Chernobyl had on 
the environment because of the variety of species that exist and the sampling that would be 
required. “Whether the observed levels of genetic anomalies in plants and animals inhabiting 
areas affected by Chernobyl accident have any detrimental biological significance to populations 
is still not known” (Geras'kin,S.A.; Fesenko,S.V.; Alexakhin,R.M., 2008). Surprisingly the 
Chernobyl accident may have benefitted certain species of animals because of the creation of a 
mostly human-free exclusion zone. Species of eagles have been able to move into the zone to 
reproduce without any human disturbances, which has been beneficial for the eagles and other 
species. However, while there may have been some beneficial effect to the accident on the 
environment, the radiation did have a negative impact on the flora and fauna around Chernobyl. 
The worst effects on the environment occurred in a twenty mile radius around the plant. 
Radiation decreased the reproductive success of much of the flora and fauna, which decreased 
both the amount and variety of plants and animals in the areas around the plant. The figure below 
diagrams a variety of the effects the radiation had with comparison to the levels that had been 
determined to be safe. One alarming point of the figure is that plants were being negatively 
impacted by radiation exposure at levels that were much lower than the threshold levels set by 
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the IAEA. This demonstrates how little was and is currently know about accurately predicting 
the effects of radiation. (Geras'kin,S.A.; Fesenko,S.V.; Alexakhin,R.M., 2008). 
 
Regulation and the Environment 
 The United States Department of Energy [DOE] does not define threshold levels 
for the environment in the same way as the threshold levels for human exposure are defined. For 
example the DOE limits the dose that can be absorbed by aquatic animals to “1 rad per day from 
Figure 12. Effects of radiation in the Chernobyl 30km exclusion zone. The figure shows the levels suggested being 
safe for plants and animals and the effects the different levels had (Geras'kin,S.A.; Fesenko,S.V.; Alexakhin,R.M., 
2008). 
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exposure to the radioactive material in liquid wastes discharged to natural waterways”. This is 
equivalent to ten times the yearly dose set by the DOE for humans (United States Department of 
Energy, 2011). This does not necessarily mean fish are being exposed to an unsafe amount of 
radiation, but demonstrates that the thresholds vary between the environment and humans. The 
DOE requires that any review of facilities dealing with radioactive waste must conform to the 
DOE’s “ALARA” principles. ALARA is an acronym for as low as reasonably achievable, and 
it’s the principle that facilities must have the best methods and equipment to limit the amount of 
radiation that is emitted into the environment. Between the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Department of Energy there is regulation on the management of radioactive 
waste, but it is often the enforcement of the regulations that is put under scrutiny.    
Overview of Massachusetts’ Fishing Industry 
Massachusetts has always had a thriving fishing industry. According to the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] the fishing industry of Massachusetts made 
$6,711,215,000 in sales in 2009 and creates nearly 78,000 jobs in the state (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2009). Any disruption of this industry would have a negative effect 
on the state’s economy, and if the fish and shellfish coming from the ocean waters near the 
Massachusetts’ coast were deemed unsafe for human consumption then the loss of jobs and 
income for the state could be immense.  
Effects of the power plant on fish reproduction 
 Radiation can have negative effects on the reproduction of any living organism 
including fish. The possibility exists that radiation exposure could render populations of fish 
sterile. It is less likely in large bodies of water because of the quick dilution of radioactive 
particles, but fallout from an accident at Pilgrim could reach Massachusetts’ lakes, rivers, and 
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reservoirs. For this reason it is important to determine if an accident at Pilgrim would have an 
effect on the reproduction of fish. Even if not killed directly from the accident, if populations of 
fish are rendered sterile it could sharply decrease the population numbers for future generations. 
In a controlled study done on Tilapia it was found that at an exposure level of .0004 - .0005 
grays of strontium-90 per day had a noticeable change on reproduction. These levels were 
maintained for 90 days providing a total dose of .036-.045 Gy, which is about four times above 
the normal background levels. The males had smaller gonads, reproduction started earlier, and 
there were 20 percent fewer normal offspring per female. The study did not consider the 
generational effects the radiation might have had. When exposed to .03 - .04 grays of radiation 
per day for 90 days all of the male Tilapia became sterile. A study of the goldfish living in Lake 
Berdenish, which was contaminated from the Kyshtym radiation accident, showed that up to 
one-fourth of the goldfish were sterile (Sazykina,T. G.; Kryshev,A. I.,2003). Based on the 
information available pertaining to the effects of radiation on the reproduction of fish, an 
accident at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station would have an impact on the reproduction of the 
fish exposed to the fallout. We would expect that an accident would result in the mild reduction 
of fish populations. 
Effects of the power plant on the health of fish 
 Pilgrim is required to submit the numbers of impinged (See Glossary) and 
entrained (See Glossary) fish and shellfish to the EPA. Impingement is the killing of adult fish 
and shellfish while entrainment is the killing of fish and shellfish eggs and larvae. This data is 
collected at specific times, averaged, and calculated as a value per year. It cannot be certain how 
accurate the information is, but it can be assumed that Entergy would not inflate the numbers as 
the EPA sets a maximum number for the number of fish that can be impinged. Over a period of 
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twenty-six years the Pilgrim power plant was responsible for the impingement of at least 562,025 
fish and shellfish and the entrainment of 24,314,325,386,670 (24 trillion) fish and shellfish eggs 
and larvae (Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2002). It is difficult to calculate the exact 
effects this has had on the populations of fish in Cape Cod Bay because fishing and pollution 
also affects the populations of fish because of other influencing factors such as pollution and 
overfishing. 
Human Health and Radiation Exposure 
Some exposure to radiation is a normal and unavoidable occurrence since there are 
natural sources of radiation in the environment.  There are certain threshold levels of radiation 
that have been set by different scientific organizations as well as the government to define what 
is considered an elevated or dangerous level of radiation exposure. These thresholds are typically 
measured in a level of radiation exposure at a single time or in the level of exposure over a year. 
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has set a standard of 1mSv per year total 
exposure for citizens. The level used to be higher at 5 mSv per year, but the DOE changed the 
level to 1mSv per year to reflect the International Commission on Radiological Protection’s 
(ICRP) standards (Stewart, F.A. et al, 2012); (United States Department of Energy, 2011). 
If an event were to occur at any nuclear facility, human exposure to radiation would be a 
concern that must be considered in any emergency preparedness plans. In order to prevent 
further contamination and illness, those exposed to radiation must take the proper steps to 
decontaminate. According to a study, exposure to radiation has been shown to be linked to 
thyroid cancer and leukemia (Davis, 2012). Different levels of radiation exposure will have 
different effects on the human body. Christodouleas, et al., (2011) outlined the different dosage 
levels received from medical procedures, and the dosages received from victims of Chernobyl. 
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Information on dosages and treatment is necessary for emergency planning. Exposure to iodine-
131 (I-131), an isotope of iodine, is responsible for the increased risk of thyroid cancer in victims 
who have been exposed to it. The treatment for exposure to I-131 is potassium iodide, but it must 
be administered before or within a few hours of exposure in order to have the best effect. In the 
event of a large scale emergency at a nuclear power plant the individuals at risk for exposure 
would need to have the potassium iodide available in order for it to be effective (Christodouleas 
et al., 2011).  Hatch et al. (2005) makes an additional point that the Chernobyl incident has 
shown that thyroid cancer is linked to radiation exposure, especially in children. The thyroids of 
children were more sensitive to radiation than the thyroids of adults, and even small doses 
increased the risk of developing thyroid cancer later in life (Hatch, 2005). Radiation exposure 
can come from the initial accident or background radiation that has been left in the environment 
after the accident. Any future genetic effects of the radiation contamination must also be 
considered. 
Thyroid Cancer 
The incidence of thyroid cancer after the Chernobyl accident increased particularly 
among children. The thyroid gland in children is more susceptible to radiation exposure because 
children require a higher amount of iodine than adults. The effects of radioactive iodine on the 
thyroid are some of the most documented topics when it comes to how radiation affects the 
human body. Because thyroid cancer develops in children who have been exposed to radioactive 
isotopes of iodine it became a noticeable trend after the Chernobyl accident. There was an 
international average rate of thyroid cancer in children of 1 for every million child per year 
before the accident while after the accident one measurement showed 44 cases of thyroid cancer 
in children for every million children per year in Belarus. (Wiliams, E. D., 2006). There were no 
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cases of thyroid cancer in a study of about 9500 children, who were born in the two years 
following the Chernobyl accident. There was 1 case of thyroid cancer recorded among about 
2400 children that would have been in utero during the Chernobyl accident, and there were 31 
cases of thyroid cancer recorded in about 9700 children who were of the age three or younger 
during the accident (Shibata, Yoshisada et al., 2001).  This strongly indicates that the Chernobyl 
accident was the cause of the increased cases of thyroid cancer in children. Iodine-131 has a 
short half-life, so children born in the years after the accident would not have been exposed to 
high levels of the radioactive isotope, and thus would not display an increased risk for thyroid 
cancer. Figure 13 from UNSCEAR’s 2008 report on Chernobyl displays the annual incidence 
rates of thyroid cancer per million for females and males in Belarus. In years following the 
accident the incidences has increased well past the previous rates. The large difference between 
the rates for females and males in the figure implies that females are more susceptible to 
Figure 13. Thyroid cancer incidence in children in Belarus. The pink bars signify females and 
blue bars signify males in the graph. The annual rate of incidence is seen as increasing after the 
Chernobyl accident (UNSCEAR, 2011). 
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developing thyroid cancer. After the Fukushima accident, citizens were being exposed to levels 
of iodine-131 which were higher than 80 percent of the average annual intake, but more time is 
required for conclusive studies to be done on how this will have affected the exposed victims 
(Murakami; Oki, 2012). We believe, based on the research, that if an accident were to occur at 
Pilgrim, children would be the most susceptible demographic to negative health effects from the 
fallout.   
Leukemia 
 Leukemia was the first cancer linked to radiation exposure after the atomic bombs were 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, leukemia is a rare disorder, and has not been 
shown to be statistically important in any European countries after the Chernobyl accident. 
While not statistically significant, there was a slight increase in the number of leukemia cases in 
Ukraine after Chernobyl (Cardis; Hatch, 2011). The workers who were exposed to fallout after 
the accident have had a slight increase in the rates of leukemia, although studies have not been 
conclusive as to whether there were increased rates of leukemia after the Chernobyl accident 
(UNSCEAR, 2011). Since leukemia is a rare disease, even in the event of a disaster like 
Chernobyl occurring at Pilgrim, it would be unlikely that Plymouth’s population would 
experience a significant increase in leukemia cases. 
Mental Health Related Effects of Nuclear Disasters 
Disasters do not only have the potential to cause physical harm, but also mental harm. 
Disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) and depression can be caused by any 
traumatic event especially ones involving the loss of life. Individuals who lived through a 
disaster can develop negative feelings and outlooks toward anything they relate to the disaster. 
We assume that enough individuals in an area have a distrust of nuclear energy then it becomes a 
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less viable source of energy for the area. The mental health of the citizens of Plymouth and the 
mental health of the surrounding area’s older population could be of the most concern. Having 
lived through the Cold War would most likely have predisposed them to negative feelings and 
fear toward anything related to radiation. Additional fear and the development of PSTD would 
be possible in the event of a disaster. This can be seen in Japan, where the grandchildren of 
survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing tend to have more negative outlooks 
about nuclear power (Palgi et al., 2012). It will be important to watch the victims of the 
Fukushima accident for depression, schizophrenia, and PTSD especially those who were 
displaced from their homes because of the evacuations (Sugihara; Suda, 2011). According to the 
United States Census Bureau, there are approximately 20,000 individuals living within ten miles 
of the power plant. Of the 20,000, about 16 percent are age 65 or older and about 22 percent is 
18 or younger. Those who are children at the time of the accident might keep a distrust and fear 
of nuclear power into their adult life. This could influence future generations similarly to what 
was found in the Journal of Psychiatric Health’s article, Mental Health and Disaster Related 
Attitudes among Japanese after the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster (Palgi et al., 2012).  
Financial Effects of an Accident 
The accident at Chernobyl and Fukushima resulted in an evacuation of the land 
immediately surrounding the plants at which the nuclear accidents occurred. Chernobyl’s 
accident created a zone that is still not safe for human use. The land will remain contaminated 
with radioactive elements such as plutonium and americium for hundreds of thousands of years 
because of the high half-lives those radioactive particles that were emitted by the plant. In both 
cases families lost their homes and industrial and agricultural land was lost. An accident at the 
Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station will have an impact on the land, environment, and thus the 
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economy of Massachusetts. It may be a temporary impact, or like Chernobyl, it could be a long-
term impact. The following section will analyze the possible consequences of an accident similar 
to the Fukushima accident.  
As has been observed at Chernobyl, a nuclear disaster can be economically crippling 
(IAEA, 2006).  The ongoing cleanup and reparation costs accumulate over decades and can be in 
the hundreds of billions of dollars.  The Chernobyl accident has cost Belarus and other 
surrounding governments an estimated $235 billion over the last hree decades, and one source 
estimates that Fukushima could cost nearly $250 billion in the first decade alone (IAEA, 2006; 
NewsOnJapan, 2012).  Furthermore, high radiation levels would remain for decades and inhibit 
settlement of the surrounding area. If cities such as Boston or Providence were quarantined, 
nearly five million people within Eastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island would be displaced 
and the societal and economic costs could be in the hundreds of billions of dollars over the 
following decades (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). 
Nuclear Power Versus Coal Power 
Currently the world uses coal as an electricity generating fuel more than any other fuel 
source. Nuclear comes behind renewables and natural gas, but still accounts for a significant 
source of the world’s electricity production See the figure below for a graph of the net electricity 
generation by fuel showing estimated growth through 2035. Nuclear power plants tend to garner 
most of the attention when it comes to safety and environmental concerns, while coal plants are 
not as regulated when it comes to emissions. This is reflected in the cost per kilowatt output of 
each type of plant. Coal plants without carbon capturing are about $3000 less per kilowatt to run 
than a nuclear power plant. Coal plants with carbon capturing equipment cost about the same as 
a nuclear power plant per kilowatt (VujiA,Jasmina; AntiA,Dragoljub P.; VukmiroviA,Zorka, 
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2012). Coal plants without carbon capturing equipment are less expensive to run, but release a 
large amount of carbon dioxide into the environment. Carbon dioxide is very harmful to Earth’s 
ecosystem and contributes to global warming. Electricity generating plants using coal also emit 
radioactive particles such as uranium (Gordanic et al., 1997). According to the United States 
Department of Labor, there were a total of 364 deaths related to coal mining in 2012 by the 14th 
of September (United States Department of Labor, 2012). When considering the negatives of 
nuclear power, it is necessary to compare nuclear power to its alternatives, and between coal and 
nuclear energy there is not strong evidence that either is better than the other. The figure below 
estimates the growth for electricity generated by coal and nuclear power through 2035. Coal 
power is expected to become a more significant source of electricity than nuclear power. 
Because coal power is less feared than nuclear power, the effects that it might have on the 
environment and human health may have been overlooked, and it is difficult to recommend coal 
as a good alternative to nuclear power. Renewable energy is the best option for the future 
because it provides a long term solution to energy needs as long as it can keep up with human 
energy consumption. 
Figure 14. World net electricity generation. The figure shows 
nuclear energy has being the fourth largest source, while coal 
is the most significant source of energy (VujiA,Jasmina; 
AntiA,Dragoljub P.; VukmiroviA,Zorka, 2012). 
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CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
 When Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s license was renewed on June 6, 2012, it 
stimulated discussion in the surrounding communities regarding the future of the nuclear power 
industry. In the opinion of a USNRC official (T. Setzer, personal communication, October 3, 
2012), those who support nuclear power also support strict regulation by separating those who 
work for the nuclear power corporations and those who regulate it. Since the regulating body for 
nuclear power in the United States granted Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station the capacity to operate 
for the next twenty years, it is evident that the disaster at Fukushima did completely change the 
presence of nuclear power in the United States.   
In spite of the similarities between Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station, the analysis and application of the Fukushima disaster scenario proved 
Pilgrim is not at risk for the same disaster. The strict regulation of Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station’s current operating procedures combined with the USNRC’s thorough inspections after 
Fukushima shows the worst-case scenario preparation at Pilgrim that could have prevented the 
disaster at Fukushima. 
Upon examining Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s unique risk factors, the most prominent 
risk was the spent fuel pools at Pilgrim. Entergy and the USRNC temporarily mitigated the risks 
posed by spent pools at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station by building more permanent dry cask 
storage Although dry cask storage is regarded as a safe way to store spent fuel, it is still not a 
permanent solution. The most permanent means of spent fuel storage is a nuclear repository, but 
there are none for nuclear power in the United States.  
66 
 
Storing spent fuel is now the most prominent issue in the nuclear power industry. As of 
June 2012, no new nuclear power plants can be licensed or existing ones relicensed until a 
permanent nuclear repository is established (Dolley, 2012). There were plans to build a 
repository in the Yucca Mountains of Nevada, but the plans were abandoned by the Obama 
administration (Reardon, 2012). Instead, the Obama administration formed the Blue Ribbon 
Commission [BRC] and charged them to find an alternative repository to the Yucca Mountains. 
Alison Macfarlane, part the BRC and now one of the USNRC’s chairwomen, explained it is 
Congress and the DOE’s responsibility to manage nuclear waste and provide a permanent 
storage facility (Dolley, 2012). 
 It has been the Department of Energy’s responsibility to provide a permanent solution 
for nuclear spent fuel since the establishment of the nuclear power industry, and they have not. 
Since the DOE has not provided a solution, a bipartisan bill is up for consideration next year that 
could remove this responsibility from the DOE (Sands, 2012). Jeff Bingaman, a democratic 
Senator from New Mexico, drafted the Nuclear-Waste Bill mentioned in the previously (Sands, 
2012). The bill calls for the establishment of a federal agency specifically in charge of spent fuel 
and nuclear waste management. Additionally, the Blue Ribbon Commission also recommended a 
separate federal agency in charge of nuclear waste management (Sands, 2012). 
Our team agrees with Senator Bingaman and recommends a single federal agency in 
charge of spent fuel and nuclear waste management be established.  Upon evaluating the risk 
factors regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, it is obvious the problems of spent fuel storage 
and nuclear waste management are central problems the entire nuclear industry is facing. If a 
body in charge of spent fuel and nuclear waste management is created, these problems that have 
threatened the future of nuclear power can be managed solely by one accountable agency.  
67 
 
It would be futile for our team to merely recommend the need for a permanent nuclear 
repository because a permanent nuclear repository has been needed since the establishment of 
the nuclear industry. Building a nuclear repository is not a simple task, but the first solution is 
charging a competent legislative body with the responsibility. Because the DOE, the governing 
body responsible for providing a nuclear repository has not completed this task, our group 
recommends the establishment of a federal agency that will.  
Pilgrim collects information on the number and species of fish and shellfish killed by the 
plant’s intake system, however there are currently no studies available on the exact effects of the 
plant on the Cape Cod’s bay. There should be a study performed by a third party on the plant’s 
intake system and whether it is doing significant harm to the fish populations in the waters 
around the plant. If it is found that the intake systems of the plant are contributing to a population 
loss then the intake must be altered to be safer to the ecosystem.  The third party should not be 
affiliated with the energy sector or Entergy. For additional safety, more measures of radioactivity 
should be taken in Plymouth and the surrounding towns. There was not as much information 
available on monthly or yearly measures of radioactivity for Plymouth as there was for a city like 
Boston for example. 
 The current evacuation plan in place does not account for a disaster of the largest possible 
magnitude.  This puts the lives of hundreds of thousands of people at risk for serious medical 
conditions including cancer and death. We have made the following recommendations based on 
our findings so that the NRC, Entergy, and the Massachusetts government may use them to make 
policy changes to maximize the safety and welfare of the population surrounding the Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station. 
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 A complete disaster plan should be able to effectively respond to any situation that arises 
in order to minimize damages and loss of life. A secondary disaster plan should be formulated so 
that it may be executed if a disaster were to occur that is outside of the scope of the current 
disaster plan.  Based on the evacuation that took place at Fukushima, this plan should include a 
larger evacuation radius encompassing a majority of Plymouth County, which would require 
more Reception Centers at safe distances from the power plant.  This would involve creating 
several more Emergency Planning Zones that include high risk towns such as Pembroke, 
Marshfield, Bridgewater, Halifax, Hanson, Middleboro, Lakeville, Plympton, Rochester, 
Wareham, Bourne, Falmouth, and Sandwich, among others.  Formulating such an evacuation 
plan would evidently be costly; however this cost is dwarfed in comparison to the cost of 
medical treatment and lives lost in the event of a disaster in which these communities are not 
evacuated. 
With the Chernobyl disaster costing more than $200 billion and Fukushima estimated to 
cost even more, it is evident that money invested in the protection and safety of Massachusetts 
residents is money well invested. The average of the estimates of the value of a life by the EPA, 
FDA, and the Transportation Department is approximately $7 million (Associated Press, 2012. 
This figure would value the lives of the 400,000 people within 20 miles of Pilgrim at $2.8 
trillion– far above the cost of preventing many of these illnesses and deaths. It is impossible to 
predict how much a disaster would cost, however we can estimate that the cost could be similar, 
if not more than, the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters. 
There is a high likelihood that Cape Cod would experience severe immediate and long 
term effects of a large disaster at Pilgrim so it is evident that the large population of the Cape 
needs to have a disaster plan.  Though the Cape may not be ordered to evacuate, we can predict 
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that many people will feel unsafe and evacuate voluntarily.  This can cause a significant amount 
of chaos and will most likely interfere with the existing evacuation plan.  It would be extremely 
beneficial to develop an evacuation plan for resident of the Cape closest to the plant so as to 
expedite the evacuation and ensure order and safety among evacuees.  For those living farther 
west, a large disaster at Pilgrim may result in a shelter in place order.  Services should be 
provided to those ordered to shelter in place, such as radiological monitoring and potassium 
iodide provision. 
If an accident were to occur, the health of the children in the area should be the top 
priority. Considering fallout will spread over large areas, the impact of an accident would have 
implications for large areas. There are preventative measures that can be taken to help prevent 
children from developing thyroid cancer in the years following the accident. Potassium iodide 
can be taken to prevent an uptake of radioactive iodine immediately after the accident. This is 
not a long term solution, but a measure that should be given to those living within the immediate 
radius of the plant. We predict that considering the wide spread of fallout is likely, and the 
source of exposure to radioactive iodine for most children is drinking milk from cows that have 
consumed contaminated feed, special measures will have to be taken for all of Massachusetts, 
and likely additional areas out of state. The Massachusetts Department of Health already has a 
publication, which details the measures that should be taken by dairy farmers in Massachusetts. 
The publication should be distributed and followed in the event of a disaster as the response of 
the food industry will be vital to the lessening the severity of the health impacts caused by the 
accident. 
It should also be noted that the website run by Entergy to provide emergency planning 
information to the public, www.pilgrimpower.com, has not been updated since 2011 and several 
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of the important external links no longer work.  This reflects poorly on Entergy’s ability to keep 
updated emergency procedures available to the public. 
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GLOSSARY 
Cladding – a covering, protective measure for a system or structure 
Decay Heat – heat released as a result of radioactive decay 
Electric field – region around electric material 
Electromagnetic radiation – any kind of radiation in which the electric fields (See Glossary) and 
magnetic fields (See Glossary) deviate at the same time, ex-rays, gamma rays, radio waves, and 
visible light. 
Entrain – the killing of adult fish or shellfish during cooling water intakes 
Exothermic reaction – any reaction that releases energy in the form of light or heat 
Fuel Outage – every 18-24 months the fission reaction at a nuclear power plant is shut down and 
one third of the fuel assemblies are replaced 
Heavy Isotope – large molecules that contain more neutrons in the nucleus 
Impinge – the killing of fish larvae during cooling water intakes 
Kinetic Energy – energy characterized by a body in motion 
Magnetic Field– region around magnetic material 
Mothball – a state of being unfit for further use and being in a state of protective  
incasement 
Neutron – a subatomic particle located in the nucleus of an atom. Neutrons have no charge and 
contain the same mass as protons 
Nuclear Repository – a multi-barrier permanent spent fuel storage site 
Oxidation Reaction – a reaction that increases the oxidation state of an element and can release 
hydrogen 
Responsible System Engineering – a sub-field of systems engineering 
Scramming – a planned shutdown of the fission reaction taking place inside a nuclear reactor 
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Ultimate Heat Sink – a virtually endless supply of water used for reactor core cooling 
Walk Down – a physical inspection any designated nuclear power plant structures 
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APPENDIX 
Definition of Radiation 
The definition of radiation is “energy radiated by waves or particles” (Merriam-Webster, 
2012). In the case of nuclear radiation the energy is coming from isotopes that give off alpha or 
beta particles or gamma rays. Gamma rays are electromagnetic rays while alpha and beta 
particles are energized particles. An alpha particle is composed of a helium nucleus, and a beta 
particle is an energized electron (Nave, 1999). The differences are not limited to gamma rays, 
alpha particles, and beta particles. There is a vast variety of radioactive isotopes and elements, 
which can decay into a completely different radioactive particle. It is not a simple science 
procedure to determine the exact effects a plant has on the environment or human life. It is most 
important to examine trends and the levels of radioactivity in the environment in determining if 
the power plant is operating safely. 
